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Whatever Happened to the "Best Interests"
Analysis in New York Relocation Cases?
A Response
Merril Sobie*
In her article Whatever Happened to the "Best Interests"
Analysis in New York Relocation Cases?,1 Justice Sondra Miller
presents a sharply critical analysis of the "exceptional circum-
stances" standard,2 applied by the New York courts in deter-
mining custody modification proceedings when the custodial
parent relocates to a geographically distant locale.3 Initially ar-
ticulated by the Court of Appeals in Weiss v. Weiss,4 the test
requires that the custodial parent establish, first, the presence
of exceptional circumstances which necessitate the relocation,
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. BA. Brooklyn College.
J.D. New York University. Professor Sobie has written widely concerning juvenile
justice and children's rights.
1. Sondra Miller, Whatever Happened to the 'Best Interests" Analysis in New
York Relocation Cases, 15 PACE L. REv. 339 (1995).
2. See Miller, supra, note 1, at 341-42, 373-76, 382-84.
3. See Miller, supra, note 1, at 340-41.
4. 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981).
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such as economic hardship or health considerations, and, sec-
ond, that relocation is in "the best interests of the child."5
Concluding, after a thorough analysis, that the standard
has resulted in confused, inconsistent, and frequently irrecon-
cilable decisions which, in fact, serve the best interests of no
one,6 Justice Miller advocates its abolition.7 To replace excep-
tional circumstances, she proposes a slightly modified "best in-
terests of the child" standard.8 Assuming prima facie evidence
that "(1) the motivation underlying the [relocation] is one of
good faith . . . ; (2) a rational basis exists for [finding] that the
relocation will provide a better life for the family unit ... ;
(3) the child will enjoy a healthy, decent lifestyle ... ; [and] (4) a
proposed visitation program will provide the noncustodial par-
ent with sufficient visitation," the court would determine
whether relocation is in the child's best interests:9
A move will be allowed, or not, because it has been demonstrated
that it is, or it is not, in the child's best interests. Exceptional
circumstances will not pose a threshold, nor will there be a pre-
sumption against relocation. If the child's best interests will be
served by a relocation, a move will be allowed. If not, the move
will be enjoined.10
For the reasons outlined in this response, I respectfully dis-
agree. In my opinion, exceptional circumstances is a fair and
equitable doctrine. As interpreted by the courts in the years
since Weiss, the standard appropriately balances the needs, in-
terests, and expectations of the custodial parent, the noncus-
todial parent, and the child. It is not perfect, but no standard
designed to balance competing interests and applied by human
institutions ever is. There have been some inconsistent re-
sults," although several seemingly conflicting cases can be rec-
onciled by examining the conduct of the custodial parent,
5. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 197 A.D.2d 771, 772, 602 N.Y.S.2d 953, 955 (3d Dep't
1993); Radford v. Propper, 190 A.D.2d 93, 100, 597 N.Y.S.2d 967, 973 (2d Dep't
1993); Holington v. Cocchiola, 180 A.D.2d 635, 636, 579 N.Y.S.2d 700, 702 (2d
Dep't 1992).
6. Miller, supra note 1, at 341, 382-85.
7. Id. at 384-85.
8. See id. at 385-87.
9. Id. at 385.
10. Id. at 386.
11. See generally infra part W1.
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specifically, whether the custodial parent sought court approval
before the move or, instead, relocated in violation of a court or-
der.12 I agree that the rule places a difficult burden on the cus-
todial parent, but believe that is where it should lie. Lastly, I
believe that the Weiss standard leads to more predictable judi-
cial determinations and guidance than the far more subjective
and vague "best interests of the child" principle.
This response will first discuss the competing interests and
expectations of the parties to a relocation dispute,'13 and briefly
outline the national view or views.14 In fact, there is no national
standard, or anything approaching a consensus among the
states.' 5 The New York experience under the exceptional cir-
cumstances standard will then be analyzed and appraised.' 6
My conclusion is that the standard should be maintained,
although I believe that the Court of Appeals should revisit the
issue to clarify the factors and criteria relevant to a
determination.' 7
I. The Interests
Child custody and visitation proceedings involve three par-
ticipants-the father, the mother, and the child or children.
Each parent has an interest in maintaining a relationship with
the child. Custody, sole or joint, is one means of securing that
relationship. Absent custody, a continuing relationship and
parenting role is provided through the mechanism we call,
rather clumsily, visitation. Visitation may result in a less in-
tense or deep parent-child relationship than custody (though
that is not always the case), but is nevertheless a very impor-
tant familial component. For this reason, caselaw requires that
visitation be awarded regardless of the best interests of the
child, absent a showing of "exceptional circumstances" or detri-
ment to the child.'8
12. See infra part IV.
13. See infra part I.
14. See infra part H.
15. See infra part H.
16. See infra parts HI and IV.
17. See infra part V.
18. See, e.g., Strah v. Strahl, 66 A.D.2d 571, 574, 414 N.Y.2d 184, 186 (2d
Dep't 1979), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 1036, 407 N.E.2d 479, 429 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1980).
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The child's interests are of a similar nature. The child has
the right to maintain a continuing and meaningful relationship
with each parent. 19 Parents may divorce each other, but do not
divorce their offspring. Visitation is therefore considered the
joint right of the child and the noncustodial parent.20 Except
when there exists a risk of physical or emotional harm, the child
should rightfully enjoy the company and input of both parents.2 '
In a custody or visitation dispute where both parents reside
in the same community, or at least within commuting range,
the rights and interests of all the participants can be protected
by balancing custody with visitation. It may not be a facile ex-
ercise, and the disappointments in dissolving an integral family
unit may be severe, but the court possesses the ability to order
the continuation of a meaningful relationship between the child
and each of the then-embattled parents.22 However, that ability
breaks down when the custodial parent decides, for whatever
reason, to relocate to a distant locale.23 Relocation is the only
voluntary event which jeopardizes the continuation of a mean-
ingful relationship with each parent. One of the bonds must be
broken, or at least severely diminished.
The precipitating fact is the custodial parent's decision to
move. Courts are powerless to prevent a parental move. By ex-
ercising his or her right to relocate, the custodial parent thereby
unilaterally frustrates the noncustodial parent's visitation or, to
phrase it more appropriately, the continuation of a meaningful
19. See, e.g., Hemphill v. Hemphill, 169 A.D.2d 29, 32, 572 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691
(2d Dep't 1991) (stating that "the best interests of a child lie in his being nurtured
and guided by both of his natural parents"); Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191, 193,
441 N.Y.S.2d 494, 494 (2d Dep't 1981) (same).
20. Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 175, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d
862, 865 (1981).
21. See generally Katz v. Katz, 97 A.D.2d 398, 398, 467 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (2d
Dep't 1983) (stating that "[in the absence of 'a pressing concern' and that proof
that visitation is inimical to the welfare of the children,' the parent to whom cus-
tody is not awarded must be granted reasonable visitation privileges") (quoting
Quinn v. Quinn, 87 A.D.2d 643,643, 448 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (2d Dep't 1982)); Hotze
v. Hotze, 57 A.D.2d 85, 87-88, 394 N.Y.S.2d 753, 756 (4th Dep't 1977) (stating that
"when the exposure of a child to one of its parents presents a risk of physical [and
emotional] harm, a court should deny visitation").
22. See generally Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 175, 418 N.E.2d at 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at
865.
23. See Miller, supra note 1, at 373 n.273.
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relationship. 24 Something has to give, and the court is faced
with the perhaps Hobson's choice of changing custody or sanc-
tioning an abridgement of the child-parent relationship unless,
of course, the custodial parent seeks prior permission to relo-
cate, is unsuccessful, and then elects to remain.
When analyzing the problem and weighing alternative so-
lutions, one should consider the continuing interests of each
participant. One should also consider the responsibilities and
obligations of custodianship. It is true, as Justice Miller notes,
that the noncustodial parent is "free to move whenever and
wherever he wishes .... "25 But it is also true that the custodial
parent, unlike his or her noncustodial counterpart, has freely
undertaken the burden of custodianship. As stated by Justice
Bracken, dissenting in Hemphill v. Hemphill,26 "I conclude that
the case must be decided with reference to the [exceptional cir-
cumstances] rule which disfavors the relocating parent, since it
is that parent who, even if for the best of reasons, must ulti-
mately be considered responsible for the breakdown of what had
been a fair and equitable custody arrangement."27
II. Other Jurisdictions
Different jurisdictions have taken, well, different views re-
garding relocation. There is no national consensus. Indeed,
there is such a multiplicity of views that the rules cannot even
be easily categorized. 28
In Minnesota, for example, there is a presumption in favor
of relocation. 29 To overcome the presumption the party oppos-
ing the relocation must "establish[ ] by a preponderance of the
evidence that the move is not in the best interests of the
child."30
24. See infra text accompanying note 27; see also generally infra part IV.
25. Miller, supra note 1, at 383.
26. 169 A.D.2d 29, 572 N.Y.S.2d 689 (2d Dep't 1991).
27. Id. at 41, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (Bracken, J., dissenting).
28. See generally Mandy S. Cohen, Note, A Toss of the Dice... The Gamble
with Post-Divorce Relocation Laws, 18 HoFsTRA L. REv. 127 (1989).
29. Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1983); see also Ayers v. Ayers,
508 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Minn. 1993); Gordon v. Gordon, 339 N.W.2d 269, 270 (Minn.
1983); Cohen, supra note 28, at 147-48.
30. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 399; see also Gordon, 339 N.W.2d at 270.
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New York is, more or less, at the opposite end of the spec-
trum, and is not alone.31 In South Carolina, for example, there
is a clear presumption against relocation.32 Removal is permit-
ted, however, in situations where it will benefit the child.33
California was in the past quite permissive in permitting
relocation. Indeed, the fact that the removal deprived the non-
custodial parent of visitation rights was held to be "'generally'
insufficient to justify restraint on the [custodial parent's] free
movement."34 However, even the mobile state par excellence
now recognizes the importance of the relationship between the
child and the noncustodial parent.35
New Jersey and Illinois, the two states analyzed by Justice
Miller,3 6 are at neither pole of the jurisdictional array. New
Jersey, which utilizes a slightly modified best interests test,37 is
31. See Cohen, supra note 28, at 137 n.57.
32. McAlister v. Patterson, 299 S.E.2d 322, 323 (S.C. 1982); see also Eckstein
v. Eckstein, 410 S.E.2d 578, 580 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991).
33. McAlister, 299 S.E.2d at 323; Marshall v. Marshall, 320 S.E.2d 44, 49-50
(S.C. Ct. App. 1984); see also Eckstein, 410 S.E.2d at 580.
34. In re Cignovich, 61 Cal. Rptr. 261, 263 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (citing Walker
v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. Rptr. 114, 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); Stack v. Stack, 11
Cal. Rptr. 177, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961)); Dozier v. Dozier, 334 P.2d 957, 961 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1959) (stating that the fact that the removal of the child from the state
would deprive the noncustodial parent of his visitation rights "is generally not
alone sufficient to justify restraint on the mother's free movement unless the [re-
moval] is inconsistent with the welfare of the child").
35. See Cooper v. Roe, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (stating
that the custodial parent seeking to remove the child from the state had the bur-
den of proving that "the move ... was both necessary to [the custodial parent] and
would have no detrimental effect on [the child] or his relationship with [the non-
custodial parent] and that it was in [the child's] best interest"); In re McGinnis, 9
Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that the custodial parent's
removal of the child from the jurisdiction would impact on the noncustodial par-
ent's "ability to have frequent and continuing contact with his or her children"); In
re Carlson, 280 Cal. Rptr. 840, 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the trial court
did not err in considering "the effect that the [custodial] mother's contemplated
move would have on the father's exercise of visitation. . ."). See also CAL. FAM.
CODE § 3020 (declaring it the public policy of California "to assure minor children
of frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have sepa-
rated or dissolved their marriage...").
36. See Miller, supra note 1, at 376-82.
37. See Holder v. Polanski, 544 A.2d 852, 855 (N.J. 1988) (holding that "a cus-
todial parent may move with the children of the marriage to another state as long
as the move does not interfere with the best interests of the children or the visita-
tion rights of the non-custodial parent"). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2 (West
1993), which provides that:
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liberal, though not as permissive as Minnesota.38 Good cause,
or at least a "sincere, good-faith reason" to relocate must be
shown.3 9 Once this burden is satisfied, the court then considers
"whether the move [would] be inimical to the best interests of
the children or [would] adversely affect the visitation rights of
the noncustodial parent."4° Illinois is more complex and, I
gather, more stringent than New Jersey in sanctioning a pro-
posed or already accomplished relocation. The burden is placed
on the custodial parent to prove that the move would be in the
best interests of the child,41 and the impact of a removal on visi-
tation between the child and the noncustodial parent is a rele-
vant factor.42
Other states follow still other permutations and variations
in grappling with the relocation dilemma.43 The multiplicity of
standards, presumptions, exceptions, and plain ambivalence
are a testament, I suppose, to the difficult issues facing the
court. In no other custody dispute are the interests of the par-
ties, parent and child alike, more difficult to bridge. Given the
lack of a national consensus, I believe it prudent that New York
move slowly, if at all, in modifying relocation standards. No one
seems to have found a better way, though many have found a
different way.
if minor children of divorced parents "are natives of [New Jersey] or have
resided five years within its limits, they shall not be removed out of [the]
jurisdiction against their own consent, if of suitable age to signify the same,
nor while under that age without the consent of both parents, unless the
court, upon cause shown, shall otherwise order.
Id.
38. See generally Cohen, supra note 28, at 137 n.57, 147-48.
39. Holder, 544 A.2d at 856 (interpreting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9-2:2 to require
that the custodial parent show a "sincere, good-faith reason" for relocating with
the child outside the jurisdiction); see also Winer v. Winer, 575 A.2d 518, 522 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
40. Holder, 544 A.2d at 856.
41. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN., ch. 750, 5/609 (Michie 1993); In re Eckert, 518
N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (M1. 1988); In re Taylor, 621 N.E.2d 273, 275 (111. App. Ct. 1993);
In re Herkert, 615 N.E.2d 833, 837 (I. App. Ct. 1993); In re Pribble, 607 N.E.2d
349, 353 (111. App. Ct. 1993); In re Ballegeer, 602 N.E.2d 852, 854 (111. App. Ct.
1992); In re Davis, 594 N.E.2d 734, 739 (M. App. Ct. 1992).
42. See, e.g., Eckert, 518 N.E.2d at 1045 (stating that the impact of the pro-
posed move on the visitation rights of the noncustodial parents "should be care-
fully considered"); In re Bednar, 496 N.E.2d 1149, 1153 (m. App. Ct. 1986).
43. See Cohen, supra note 28, at 130 nn.20, 21.
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III. Application of the Exceptional Circumstances Standard
Before considering the impact of the New York exceptional
circumstances standard, it may be helpful to outline those situ-
ations in which it does not apply. First, exceptional circum-
stances need be shown only for relocation to a distant locale.44
There exists a plethora of decisions allowing a relocation over a
"reasonable" distance, coupled, when appropriate, with modi-
fied visitation provisions. 45 The custodial parent is quite free to
move with the child to the next town, the next county, or even
from Westchester County to Suffolk County, i.e., from one end
of the New York City suburbs to the other.46 In determining the
issue of "distance" the numeric mileage as well as the travel
time, and burden and expense of travel are all relevant. 47
Second, the standard is not relevant when the noncustodial
parent has failed to establish or continue a meaningful relation-
ship with the child.48 After all, the rule's purpose is the preser-
vation of a meaningful relationship, unless exceptional
circumstances exist which outweigh that consideration. 49 Not
44. See Bennett v. Bennett, 208 A.D.2d 1042, 1043, 617 N.Y.S.2d 931, 932 (3d
Dep't 1994) (stating that the exceptional circumstances standard "does not apply
when the relocation 'is not so distant as to deprive the noncustodial parent of regu-
lar and meaningful access to the child'") (quoting Lake v. Lake, 192 A.D.2d 751,
752-53, 596 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (3d Dep't 1993)).
45. See, e.g., Lake v. Lake, 192 A.D.2d 751, 596 N.Y.S.2d 171 (3d Dep't 1993);
Jacoby v. Carter, 167 A.D.2d 786, 563 N.Y.S.2d 344 (3d Dep't 1990); Partridge v.
Myerson, 162 A.D.2d 507, 556 N.Y.S.2d 707 (2d Dep't 1990); Lenenthal v. Webster,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 27, 1990, at 23 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
46. See Partridge, 162 A.D.2d at 509, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 709. The custodial par-
ent, however, may be constrained by a "radius" provision in a separation agree-
ment whereby the parent agrees to a relocation restriction.
47. Radford v. Propper, 190 A.D.2d 93, 100, 597 N.Y.S.2d 967, 972 (2d Dep't
1993); Blundell v. Blundell, 150 A.D.2d 321, 324, 540 N.Y.S.2d 850, 853 (2d Dep't
1989).
48. See Radford, 190 A.D.2d at 99, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 972 (stating that in order
to reach the question of exceptional circumstances, it must first be demonstrated
that the relocation would deprive the noncustodial parent of "frequent and regular
access to his or her children").
49. See Bennett, 208 A.D.2d at 1043, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 932 (3d Dep't 1994)
(stating that "the benchmark against which the applicability of the relocation rule
is measured is 'meaningful access', i.e., the ability of a noncustodial parent to con-
tinue to maintain a close and meaningful relationship with his or her children
.. "); Radford,. 190 A.D.2d at 99, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 972 (stating that" '[t]he overrid-
ing concern is with the best interests of the children, which are clearly nurtured by
a continued relationship with a noncustodial parent who has maintained reason-
able visitation . . .'") (quoting Ferguson v. Ressico, 125 A.D.2d 915, 916, 510
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surprisingly, the cases rejecting a relocation bid are replete
with statements concerning the consistency of visitation and
other indicia of close bonds between the child and the noncus-
todial parent.50 Of course, parents who contest a relocation are
likely to have fully exercised visitation-an uncaring father or
mother will probably not object to a relocation, or at least will
not be willing to devote the time and expense necessary to liti-
gate the matter.
Where the two "threshold" facts have been satisfied, i.e.,
the move is to a distant locale and the noncustodial parent has
maintained a meaningful relationship, the exceptional circum-
stances test becomes relevant and the custodial parent seeking
relocation, or who has already relocated, has the burden of
proof.51 The factors which are encompassed by this standard
are comprehensibly explained in Justice Miller's article. 52 Suf-
fice it to say that the standard is not readily fulfilled. There
must be an economic necessity, a specific job opportunity not
available near home, a health necessity, or other compelling
reason.53 In my opinion, that is appropriate.
Only one contingency, remarriage, has resulted in several
apparently unfair decisions. 54 The issue is whether the custo-
dial parent's remarriage to a spouse who resides and is em-
ployed in a distant geographic area constitutes an exceptional
circumstance, particularly when the new spouse cannot easily
N.Y.S.2d 275, 276 (3d Dep't 1986)). See generally Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170,
175, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (1981).
50. See, e.g., Bennett, 208 A.D.2d at 1043, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 933; Raybin v.
Raybin, 205 A.D. 2d 918, 920, 613 N.Y.S.2d 726, 728 (3d Dep't 1994); Radford, 190
A.D.2d at 99, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 972; Leslie v. Leslie, 180 A.D.2d 620, 622, 579
N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (2d Dep't 1992); Rybicki v. Rybicki, 176 A.D.2d 867, 871, 575
N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (2d Dep't 1991); Wiles v. Wiles, 171 A.D.2d 398, 400, 578
N.Y.S.2d 292, 293 (4th Dep't 1991).
51. See Lake v. Lake, 192 A.D.2d 751, 752, 596 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (3d Dep't
1993); Radford, 190 A.D.2d at 99-100, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 972-73; see also Bennett,
208 A.D.2d at 1043-44,617 N.Y.S.2d at 933; Atkinson v. Atkinson, 197 A.D.2d 771,
772, 602 N.Y.S.2d 953, 955 (3d Dep't 1993); Wiles, 171 A.D.2d at 400, 578 N.Y.S.2d
at 293.
52. See Miller, supra note 1, at part M.A.
53. Bennett, 208 A.D.2d at 1044, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 933; Atkinson, 197 A.D.2d at
772, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 955; see also Richardson v. Howard, 135 A.D.2d 1140, 1140,
523 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (4th Dep't 1987).
54. See, e.g., Elkus v. Elkus, 182 A.D.2d 45,588 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1st Dep't 1992);
Cooper-Jones v. Williams, 162 A.D.2d 1001, 557 N.Y.S.2d 214 (4th Dep't 1990);
Richardson v. Howard, 135 A.D.2d 1140, 523 N.Y.S.2d 272 (4th Dep't 1987).
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move to the child's locale. In Weiss, the Court of Appeals fore-
saw the possibility and, in dicta, differentiated remarriage:
"[A]s we know, this is not a case where the obligations under-
taken by a divorced parent who marries anew require a dra-
matic change of locale."55
In recent years the Appellate Division, Second Department,
has treated remarriage as an exceptional circumstance. That
was the situation in Hemphill v. Hemphill,56 where the new
husband's "business or livelihood depended upon his living and
working in England."57 However, the First and Fourth Depart-
ments have not followed suit. In Elkus v. Elkus,58 for example,
the First Department held that the fact that the custodial par-
ent's new spouse resided in California and could not relocate did
not constitute exceptional circumstances. 59
Remarriage is one issue which warrants clarification by the
Court of Appeals. Placing the custodial parent in the untenable
position of sacrificing child custody or a spouse serves no one.
In effect, the new spouse should stand in the shoes of the custo-
dial parent. If failure to relocate will result in economic hard-
ship, exceptional circumstances should be satisfied and the
court should turn to the best interests of the child.
Best interests is the final prong of a relocation determina-
tion. That standard always constitutes the overarching consid-
eration in a custody case.60  Even when exceptional
circumstances are shown, the court should and will determine
whether relocation is in the child's best interest. Conversely,
custody should not be changed to the noncustodial parent with-
55. Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 177, 418 N.E.2d 377, 381, 436 N.Y.S.2d
862, 866 (1981).
56. 169 A.D.2d 29, 571 N.Y.S.2d 689 (2d Dep't 1991).
57. Id. at 32, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 691. But see LoBianco v. LoBianco, 131 A.D.2d
642, 516 N.Y.S.2d 724 (2d Dep't 1987) (precluding the child's move to Canada after
conducting a complete "best interests" analysis).
58. 182 A.D.2d 45, 588 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1st Dep't 1992).
59. Id. at 49, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 140; see also Richardson v. Howard, 135 A.D.2d
1140, 1140, 523 N.Y.S. 272, 273 (4th Dep't 1987) (holding that the custodial
mother's desire to remarry and move to her new husband's locale was an insuffi-
cient justification for removal of the children).
60. Miller, supra note 1, at 366 & n.244 (citing Lavane v. Lavane, 201 A.D.2d
623, 623, 608 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (2d Dep't 1994); Radford v. Propper, 190 A.D.2d
93, 100, 597 N.Y.S.2d 967, 973 (2d Dep't 1993); Klein v. Klein, 93 A.D.2d 807, 808,
460 N.Y.S.2d 607, 608 (2d Dep't 1983); Daghir v. Daghir, 82 A.D.2d 191, 193, 441
N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (2d Dep't 1981)).
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out an exploration of best interests. Thus, as noted by Justice
Miller, in LoBianco v. LoBianco61 the court assessed all relevant
considerations before transferring custody. 62 No reasonable
person would advocate transferring custody to an unfit parent,
or urge a modification which conflicts directly with the interests
of the child. The difficulty lies in the large number of cases
where both parents are fit, capable, and concerned, and where
the child has developed a meaningful relationship with both.
There, and only there, should a relocation be precluded unless
outweighed by necessity or hardship. The fact that the excep-
tional circumstances standard has been appropriately applied
in many cases simply means that in the majority of litigated
relocation matters each parent is fit and caring.
IV. The Exceptional Circumstances Standard Appraised
In my opinion, the exceptional circumstances standard has
served the state better than would any alternative. There al-
ways are and always will be some inconsistencies when the
courts adjudicate emotional human needs and desires. As noted
by Justice Miller, there also have been an unusual number of
appellate reversals.6 3 That phenomenon may indicate the need
for appropriate guidance, perhaps by the Court of Appeals, but
is not, in itself, a reason to change the standard.
Several seemingly inconsistent decisions can be reconciled
by looking at the conduct of the custodial parent. A relocation
case may be filed either before or after the move to a distant
locale. When the custodial parent petitions for court approval
prior to the move, he or she is probably asking in good faith, or
at least has not intentionally undermined the other party's in-
terest. However, when the parent relocates without permis-
sion, visitation rights are unilaterally frustrated, or, worse,
terminated. Further, the relocating parent has violated an ex-
isting court order or agreement, and is probably in contempt of
court. While violation of a court order is not in itself disposi-
61. 131 A.D.2d 642, 516 N.Y.S.2d 724 (2d Dep't 1987).
62. See Miller, supra note 1, at 362 (citing LoBianco, 131 A.D.2d at 643, 516
N.Y.S.2d at 725).
63. See Miller, supra note 1, at 373 n.272 and cases cited therein.
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tive,64 courts appear to be very reluctant to find exceptional cir-
cumstances in those situations.65
Indeed, a "fait accompli" relocation is usually disallowed.
Of eight appellate cases in the past decade, six denied a post-
relocation attempt to seek judicial approval.6 6 The message is
clear. Parents who relocate in violation of a court order do so at
their peril, in my opinion rightly so.
There are apparent inconsistencies between departments
when a parent seeks prior judicial approval or the noncustodial
parent seeks to enjoin a move. The Third Department appears
to apply the exceptional circumstances test strictly,67 while the
Second and Fourth Departments are more flexible.68 Somewhat
64. See Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 94, 432 N.E.2d 765, 767-
68, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895-96 (1982) (stating that "self-help through abduction by
the noncustodial parent must be deterred but even that 'must, when necessary, be
submerged to the paramount concern in all custody matters: the best interest of
the child...'") (quoting Nehra v. Uhiar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 250, 372 N.E.2d 4, 8, 401
N.Y.S.2d 168, 172 (1977)); Wodka v. Wodka, 168 A.D.2d 1000, 1001, 565 N.Y.S.2d
353, 354 (4th Dep't 1990) (stating that "defiance of a court order is but one factor to
be considered when determining the relative fitness of the parties and what cus-
tody arrangement is in the child's best interests").
65. See, e.g., Schultz v. Schultz, 199 A.D.2d 1065, 606 N.Y.S.2d 480 (4th Dep't
1993); Ellor v. Ellor, 145 A.D.2d 773, 535 N.Y.S.2d 643 (3d Dep't 1988); Morgano v.
Morgano, 119 A.D.2d 734, 511 N.Y.S.2d 146 (2d Dep't 1986).
66. The six cases are: Schultz v. Schultz, 199 A.D.2d 1065, 606 N.Y.S.2d 480
(4th Dep't 1993); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 197 A.D.2d 771, 602 N.Y.S.2d 953 (3d Dep't
1993); Sanders v. Sanders, 185 A.D.2d 716, 585 N.Y.S.2d 891 (4th Dep't 1992);
Ellor v. Ellor, 145 A.D.2d 773, 535 N.Y.S.2d 643 (3d Dep't 1988); Morgano v. Mor-
gano, 119 A.D.2d 734, 511 N.Y.S.2d 146 (2d Dep't 1986); Barie v. Faulkner, 115
A.D.2d 1003, 497 N.Y.S.2d 565 (4th Dep't 1985).
The post-relocation cases permitting relocation of the child are: Schouten v.
Schouten, 155 A.D.2d 461, 547 N.Y.S.2d 126 (2d Dep't 1989); Pecorello v.
Snodgrass, 142 A.D.2d 920, 530 N.Y.S.2d 350 (4th Dep't 1988).
67. See Bennett v. Bennett, 208 A.D.2d 1042, 617 N.Y.S.2d 931 (3d Dep't
1994) (finding that the custodial mother's desire to move 180 miles to attend col-
lege did not constitute exceptional circumstances, since her desire to relocate was
prompted by "betterment rather than necessity," and since the move would "dis-
rupt [the noncustodial father's] ability to continue a close and meaningful relation-
ship with his children"); Murphy v. Murphy, 195 A.D.2d 794,600 N.Y.S.2d 373 (3d
Dep't 1993) (holding that the custodial mother's need for contact with and emo-
tional support from her close friends in the Rochester area did not constitute ex-
ceptional circumstances and that the move would deny the father, in Saugerties,
meaningful contact with his children).
68. See Hemphill v. Hemphill, 169 A.D.2d 29, 572 N.Y.S.2d 689 (2d Dep't
1991) (holding that the custodial mother's remarriage to an English citizen consti-
tuted exceptional circumstances and that it was "in the best interests of the chil-
dren to continue to reside with their mother"); Pecorello v. Snodgrass, 142 A.D.2d
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different approaches between departments are not uncommon,
and custody cases are notoriously case specific, involving differ-
ent facts and circumstances.
One additional observation: Relocation, unlike almost any
other custody proceeding, does not invariably result in the pre-
vailing party achieving actual custody. The issue is whether to
permit relocation of the child, or deny such permission. If a re-
location request is granted, custody is obviously not changed.
But even if a relocation request is denied, custody may not be
modified. In that event the custodial parent has a choice of relo-
cating and surrendering custody, or not relocating and main-
taining custody. No wonder a straight best interests standard
is not utilized.
If the custodial parent does not relocate, the result may
well be in the child's best interest-both parties remain avail-
able and the child can maintain a meaningful relationship with
each. We do not know how many custodial parents who fail to
prevail in obtaining judicial approval subsequently elect to re-
main. Given the emotional ties and the overwhelming impor-
tance of custody to most parents, many surely remain and
continue the pre-existing custody and visitation scheme. For all
we know, even Rosalyn Weiss, the infamous respondent in the
Court of Appeals landmark exceptional circumstances case,69
decided to forego her intended "new life" in Las Vegas for the
mundane life of raising her child in New York.
V. Justice Miller's Proposed Solution
As has been noted, Justice Miller advocates that the excep-
tional circumstances test be replaced by a "best interests of the
child" standard. 70 Although tempered somewhat by requiring,
as threshold facts, that the motivation for the move be one of
good faith, that relocation will provide a better lifestyle, and
that sufficient visitation will be provided,71 the thrust is pure
best interests. Thus, "[tihe basic change proposed is not a mat-
920, 530 N.Y.S.2d 350 (4th Dep't 1988) (holding that the custodial mother's remar-
riage constituted exceptional circumstances, where her new husband's employ-
ment was "involuntarily transferred" to another state due to a merger).
69. Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 418 N.E.2d 377, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1981).
70. See Miller, supra note 1, at 385-87.
71. See id. at 385.
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ter of preference between fathers and mothers, but rather one of
focus on the child considering all factors impacting upon that
child's best interest unimpeded by rigid preconditions." 72
There are several problems in applying a straight best in-
terest of the child approach, or even a slightly modified version.
First, the focus would be, as intended, only upon the child. Yet
visitation or a continuing meaningful relationship is a joint
right between the child and the noncustodial parent.73 As has
been noted, relocation is the only voluntary event which jeopar-
dizes that relationship. Vacation visitation from a distant lo-
cale, while possible, is in no way the equivalent. A father or
mother who sees his or her child on several occasions during the
week, attends the child's school, athletic, and social functions,
entertains the child's friends, and communicates constantly
should not be readily forced to accept vacation visitation. Every
facet of the parent-child relationship merits preservation, or at
least should be maintained unless clearly outweighed by excep-
tional circumstances.
Second, the best interest standard is a highly subjective
doctrine. 74 Just why it would result in greater predictability
than the exceptional circumstances test 75 is unfathomable to
this writer. Economic or health necessity, each a component of
the present exceptional circumstances standard,76 are relatively
objective criteria. On the other hand, whether the child is bet-
ter off at a new location with the custodial parent, new friends
and a fresh environment, as opposed to residing in the old tried-
and-true location with existing friends and a continuation of the
noncustodial relationship, is far more subjective and, therefore,
unpredictable. Reasonable people will differ.
72. Id. at 387.
73. See Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d at 175, 418 N.E.2d at 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
74. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions
in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 229 (1975) (stating
that "determination of what is 'best' or least detrimental' for a particular child is
usually indeterminative and speculative).
75. See Miller, supra note 1, at 341-42.
76. See supra text accompanying note 53; see also Bennett v. Bennett, 208
A-D.2d 1042, 1044, 617 N.Y.S.2d 931, 933 (3d Dep't 1994); Atkinson v. Atkinson,
197 A.D.2d 771, 772, 602 N.Y.S.2d 953, 955 (3d Dep't 1993); Richardson v. How-
ard, 135 A.D.2d 1140, 1140, 523 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (4th Dep't 1987).
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Best interests of the child presently constitutes an essential
part of the two-pronged Weiss standard and should continue as
an important component. However, it should not constitute the
sole basis upon which to predicate a relocation determination.
Third, a straight best interest test confuses the narrow is-
sue of relocation with a broad issue of custody generally. Cus-
tody is always modifiable based on the best interests of the
child.77 The noncustodial parent may accordingly petition at
any time for custody and, if successful, the child thereafter re-
sides with that parent. Relocation cases are different. As men-
tioned, the object is to prevent relocation and not necessarily
change custody. If the noncustodial parent prevails, the custo-
dial parent has a choice-relocate without the child or remain
with the child.
If the noncustodial parent has sufficient grounds to modify
custody based on the best interests of the child, other than the
relocation, he or she should bring the action on that basis. The
result, if successful, is custody-no ands, ifs, or buts. Why
prove best interests in the context of a relocation case only to
have the losing parent say, "sorry, I've had second thoughts and
will stay and of course will stay with Johnnie"? In sum, we
should not confuse a straight best interests modification action,
which always places custody on the line, with a relocation case,
which does not place custody directly on the line.
Last, substitution of a best interest of the child standard
would defeat the prophylactic value of the exceptional circum-
stances doctrine. Many custodial parents would prefer to relo-
cate for many different reasons, good or bad. With the
knowledge that they must prove exceptional circumstances,
many undoubtedly decide against relocation. The cases which
are litigated tend to be those in which the parent believes he or
she has a good chance of prevailing under the standard. If a
best interests test were substituted, court approval would be
easier to obtain, or at least would appear easier to the parent.
Pleadings and proof would revolve about that highly broad inde-
terminate standard. Should we encourage litigation, particu-
77. See generally Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 93, 432 N.E.2d
765, 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (1982).
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larly custody litigation with its baggage of emotionalism,
tension, and unpredictability?
VI. Conclusion
The exceptional circumstances rule is a sound principle.
Intended to balance the interests and expectations of each par-
ent and the child, the rule preserves the parent-child relation-
ship, when meaningful, between the noncustodial parent and
the child unless "exceptional circumstances" outweigh the bene-
fit of such preservation. Further, the rule does not in itself re-
sult in a change of custody. Custodial parents may choose, post-
litigation, to refrain from relocating, thereby maintaining the
status quo (unless the parent has already rashly relocated in
defiance of a court order or agreement). In the absence of a
compelling reason or a necessity to move, recognized under the
rule, that is probably the most equitable result.
Best interests of the child should continue as a significant
factor in relocation cases. However, it should not be elevated to
the status of the sole or even primary consideration. Substitu-
tion of a straight best interest standard would render the im-
portant policy of continuing a meaningful relationship with
each parent a virtual nullity. Further, application would en-
courage litigation, decrease predictability, and might result in
even greater inconsistencies than at present.
The Court of Appeals should nevertheless revisit the issue
to clarify the standard and resolve some of the ambiguities and
uncertainty. In my opinion, the Court should state clearly and
explicitly that the existence of a full meaningful relationship be-
tween the noncustodial parent and the child constitutes an es-
sential precondition to applying the exceptional circumstances
test. Further, every indicia of the relationship should be ex-
amined, perhaps assisted by appropriate forensic evaluations.
One must have developed a relationship worthy of protection
before expecting the court to order its preservation.
Second, the Court of Appeals should hold that remarriage
to a spouse who resides and is employed in a distant locale may
constitute an exceptional circumstance. In essence, the new
spouse should stand in the shoes of the custodial parent. If re-
maining at the distant locale constitutes an economic necessity
or other exceptional circumstance for the new spouse, the relo-
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cation of the child should be permitted unless a best interest
analysis concludes otherwise.
The exceptional circumstances standard first articulated in
Weiss has served the state well for the past fourteen years. In
an increasingly mobile and an increasingly insecure society, a
doctrine which encourages a meaningful parent-child relation-
ship with each parent warrants judicial continuation and re-
affirmation.
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